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NOTES
A CALL FOR CLARIFICATION: ACHIEVING A
UNIFORM PROOF STRUCTURE IN REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION CASES UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress drafted the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")'
with the noble goal of proscribing discrimination against disabled
individuals . Nevertheless, as critics have pointed out, the majority of
plaintiffs have been frustrated in their efforts to prove that they should
be entitled to relief for the discrimination they have allegedly suffered.3
In particular, employees have had very little success litigating claims
seeking a reasonable accommodation for their disability that would
enable them to perform the essential functions of their job.4
Significant factors contributing to the vastly pro-defendant
outcomes in reasonable accommodation cases arise from the wellrecognized ambiguities embodied in the ADA. 5 Specifically, one
prominent ambiguity is the failure to provide a clear proof structure.
Under the ADA, an employer unlawfully discriminates where it fails to
make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
I. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Id. § 12101(b)(l).
3. E.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999) (arguing that since its inception, the ADA has not been
enforced consistently with its goal of eliminating discrimination against disabled individuals).
4. Id. (demonstrating that employers win approximately 93% of both trial and appellate court
decisions).
5. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1533 (2002) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that Congress' failure to replicate integral provisions of Title VII while
relying upon it to draft the ADA has rendered the ADA ambiguous); see also Steven S. Locke, The
Incredible Shrinking ProtectedClass: Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 108 (1997) (illustrating the response of the courts to the
ambiguous provisions found within the ADA).
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limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is
an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity .... ,6 This language
ostensibly requires employees simply to prove that they were not
afforded a reasonable accommodation for their- disability, while
requiring employers to demonstrate that the proposed accommodation
would impose an undue hardship under the circumstances.7 While the
ADA attempts to define the terms reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship, 9 the statute is silent as to the precise manner in which
they should be allocated and proved at various points in the litigation
process. Additionally, the ADA fails to quantify the amount of proof
required to carry each burden and fails to define demonstrate
altogether.' °
Despite how minor these omissions may seem, they have been a
source of significant confusion. Consequently, the allocation and
quantum of burdens of proof in reasonable accommodation cases has
naturally resulted in varying interpretations amongst the courts.'
Attempting to resolve this quandary, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") 2 has interpreted the statute with respect to
reasonable accommodations in a manner that logically allocates the
relevant burdens of proof amongst the parties. 3 The EEOC's
interpretations of the problematic proof structure and the term
reasonable accommodation have been viewed by the courts as too proplaintiff and against the plain meaning of the statute. As a result, the
EEOC has not been given deference. 4 Instead, the courts adopted their
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The Act defines "covered entity" as "an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." Id. § 12111(2).
7. Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 258-60 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing the
employee's burden of showing an accommodation is reasonable vis-A-vis the employer's burden of
showing undue hardship).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
9. Id. § 12111(10)..
10. Significantly, Congress resolved a similar ambiguity by amending Title VII to expressly
define the word demonstrate to mean "meets the burdens of production and persuasion." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(m) (2000) (emphasis added). This simple change was very effective in clarifying burdens
of proof under Title VII.
11. See infra Part III.
12. The EEOC was mandated by Congress to be the administrative agency to enforce Title I
of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)-(p) (2002); 29 C.F.R §§ app. 1630.2(o), 1630.9; Brief of Amici
Curiae The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 9-16, Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc.,
244 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1966) [hereinafter EEOC's Amicus Brief].
14. See infra Part IV.
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own proof structures, leaving the ADA's application at odds on a
national level.1 5 For example, one approach shifts either the burden of
production or persuasion between the parties.'6 Another approach utilizes
what are herein referred to as "traditional burdens of proof." 7
The variations in the proof structures utilized by the courts exhibit the
inconsistent application of the ADA.
Further complicating the matter is the Supreme. Court's five-to-four
decision in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett." In Barnett, the Court defined a
meritless reasonable accommodation claim as one that is neither facially
reasonable, nor reasonable in the "run of cases."' 9 This vague standard
has left lower courts with little guidance. Although the Barnett proof
structure is aimed at dismissing meritless claims, courts are now
confronted with the new problem of interpreting what constitutes
facially reasonable or reasonable in the run of cases. 0 If pre-Barnett
precedent continues to be relied upon, that which is considered facially
reasonable or reasonable in the run of cases in one circuit may not be
deemed reasonable in another.,
As a federal statute, the ADA should be uniformly applied
throughout the country. Therefore, the allocation and quantum of
burdens of proof in reasonable accommodation cases should be

15. See infra Part III.
16. For further discussion of this approach, see infra Part M.A.
17. For further discussion of this approach, see infra Part II.B.
18. 122 S. Ct. 1516. With two concurring opinions and two dissents, the Court barely arrived
at a compromise in holding that a bona fide seniority system provided for under a collective
bargaining agreement will usually take precedence over a disabled employee's request for
reassignment as a means of accommodating his or her disability. Id.
19. Id. at 1523. The Court created a proof structure that is contrary to EEOC and statutory
guidance. The Court's proof structure cannot be criticized as being unfair to employees as it affords
employees with colorable claims their day in court. No case would be dismissed, as a matter of law,
where the proposed accommodation is at least facially reasonable, or would be reasonable in light of
foregoing precedent (i.e., "in the run of cases"), even if the proposed accommodation is not listed as
a reasonable method of accommodation in the ADA or in the EEOC's interpretations. Id. The
Barnett decision may be aligned with legislative history, which reveals that "the decision as to what
reasonable accommodation is appropriate is one which must be determined based on the particular
facts of the individual case." S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt, 2, at
62 (1990) (indicating legislative intent). However, this history is plainly at odds with the standards
sought in the ADA's purpose section, i.e., to "provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities ....
42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(2) (2000).
20. 122 S. Ct. at 1523; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2); Stephen S. Churchill, A Fly in the Web: The
Developing Law of Reasonable Accommodations, 46 B.B.J. 10 (2002) (arguing the courts' attempts
to determine when a reasonable accommodation must be provided often raise just as many questions
as they answer); see infra Part III (discussing the split amongst the circuit courts with regard to
allocating and quantifying burdens of proof under the ADA).
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consistently applied.2 To achieve uniform interpretation of similar
statutory language, the Supreme Court is willing to overturn its own
decisions "to correct a seriously erroneous interpretation of statutory
language that would undermine congressional policy as expressed in
other legislation. 22 Accordingly, the word "demonstrate '23 as it appears
in the ADA should be construed uniformly with the definition of the
word "demonstrate" -as it appears in Title VII. 24 Such an interpretation
suggests that employers would bear the burdens of production and
persuasion to show the unreasonableness of the proposed
accommodation(s). This simple inferential step would help resolve the
disparity in interpretation amongst the courts, promoting an environment
in employment discrimination law that is more conducive towards
achieving equal treatment for disabled workers. As it stands, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to overturn the Barnett decision because it is
not a seriously erroneous interpretation of the ADA. Therefore, this note
calls upon Congress to clarify the proof structure in reasonable
accommodation cases under the ADA.
This note analyzes the issue of allocating and quantifying burdens
of proof in reasonable accommodation cases under the ADA.
The approaches articulated by the courts, as well as the EEOC, are
questioned based upon the theory that parties litigating such cases
should bear burdens of proof that are uniform in the manner in which
they are allocated and in the quantum of proof required to satisfy the
burden imposed. Part II identifies and explains the ambiguous provisions
of the ADA that give rise to this burden of proof quandary. Part III
illustrates the various judicial interpretations of the ADA's ambiguous
language and argues for an equitable interpretation of the ADA. Part IV
considers the EEOC's interpretations of the ADA and the lack of judicial
deference to the agency's views on this matter. Part V proposes a means
of resolving the issue by analogizing it to Title VII's modification by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.

21. In other words, the amount of evidence that a party must offer to satisfy its burden should
be the same, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the case is being litigated.
22. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(citations omitted).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2000).
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II. INTERPRETING THE ADA's AMBIGUOUS STANDARDS
Congress enacted the ADA to provide "clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities., 25 The ADA was drafted broadly so as to reach a multitude
of disability discrimination cases,26 and it was passed with considerable
bipartisan support.27 .In the employment context, the ADA prohibits
discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability in all
employment practices, including "job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."28
The ADA defines "discrimination" as:
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if
such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of
21
the employee or applicant....
Thus, an employer must reasonably accommodate a qualified
employee with a disability unless the employer can prove that doing so
would cause an undue hardship on the operation of its business.
On their face, the foregoing provisions might seem logical and
simple to implement. However, a closer reading reveals a complicated
issue of statutory interpretation: courts must somehow reconcile the term
reasonable as modifying the term accomodation even though the
unreasonableness of a proporsed accomodation is, in itself, the essence
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
26. Id. § 12101(a)(3). In addition to employment, the broad scope of the ADA also prohibits
discrimination in "housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication,
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services .... " Id.
27. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 35 GA. L.
REV. 27, 30 n.2 (2002). In fact, 93.8% of Senators and 93.1% of Representatives present and voting
supported passage of the Act. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
29. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B). To avoid liability for discrimination under the ADA, employers
must provide reasonable accomodations for employees that qualify as individuals with a disability
under the Act. Significantly, an employer that would experience an undue hardship by
accommodating a particular disability is not required to do so. Id.
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of proving an undue hardship. In Barnett,3° the Supreme Court tried to
resolve this quandary by defining a reasonable accomodation as one
which "seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of
cases."" Such circular reasoning perpetuates the ADA's ambiguity.
Although the Barnett language might diminish frivolous and meritless
claims by giving judges broad discretion, it may also cause employees to
request only traditionally accepted accomodations as opposed to other
viable alternatives.
Interpreting legislative ambiguities is the function of the judiciary
and the duly delegated administrative agencies. 2 Thus, the ambiguities
and gaps found within the ADA should be resolved by the courts and the
relevant agencies." As one commentator has pointed out:
Courts, in response to initial concerns that too many people with minor
conditions were qualifying as disabled, have been ratcheting up the
prima facie standard for plaintiffs in order to weed out the allegedly
undeserving. However, in their efforts to eradicate frivolous lawsuits,
courts have effectively steered the analytical focus away from the
ADA's original aim of aiding disadvantaged individuals' integration
into the job market. As a consequence, what was once touted as "the
most comprehensive civil rights legislation passed by Congress since
the 1964 Civil Rights Act," has become increasingly
3 4 narrowed to the
point where it is in danger of becoming ineffective.
To that end, one disability group has argued that the ADA's reach and
effectiveness has been so limited by the courts that employees must rely
on state discrimination laws for protection.33

30. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
31. Id. at 1523. If courts continue to rely on pre-Bamett decisions to determine what
constitutes reasonable in the run of cases, inconsistent rulings throughout the circuits are bound to
persist. Churchill, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that inconsistencies have resulted from courts'
attempts to determine when a reasonable accommodation must be provided).
32. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
33. See infra Part IV.
34. Locke, supra note 5, at 108-09 (citations omitted).
35. Bob Egelko, Disability law suffers in high court; 4 recent rulings undercut ADA, say
groups that work with disabled, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 2002, at A-4.
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III.

SILENCE IN THE

ADA BREEDS CONFUSION

AMONGST THE COURTS:

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION LAW PRE-BARNETT

The ADA has rightfully come under fire because of its ambiguous
standards. 36 Although the statute attempts to define both reasonable
accommodation37 and undue hardship 3s by giving practical examples and
listing factors to be considered, the statute is not clear as to their limits
and relation to each other. 9 In addition, the statute is unclear as to
precisely what proof structure should be used to apply these vague
standards.4 0 Absent a clear standard, circuit courts have developed and
implemented different methods of burden allocation on their own, in
many cases borrowing standards
from analogous statutes such as Title
42
V11 4' and the Rehabilitation Act.
The Supreme Court first attempted to resolve the issue of burden
allocation in reasonable accommodation cases in Barnett. 3 The Court
only considered approaches taken by the First," Second 45 and District of
Columbia 46 Circuit Courts of Appeals without accounting for the

36. Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights
Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 343-62 (2001) (addressing the conflict between the traditional
concept of civil rights and the ADA's requirement of reasonable accommodations, as well as
judicial decisions weakening the ADA's power of enforcement); Cheryl L. Anderson, "Deserving
Disabilities": Why the Definition of Disability Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct Should Be
Revised to Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 Mo. L. REV. 83, i09-29 (2000)
(arguing the ADA treats persons with disabilities different from others in a way that undermines the
goals of civil rights theory and the very concept of a disability); Colker, supra note 3 (noting
disabled employees' overwhelming failure in litigating employment discrimination claims under the
ADA).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
38. Id. § 12111(10).
39. Specifically, the statute fails to explain the full limit of the word "reasonable" in both 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), defining "discrimination," and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), defining "qualified
individual with a disability." Leslie Goddard, Searching for Balance in the ADA: Recent
Developments in the Legal and Practical Issues of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 IDAHO L. REV.
227, 233 (1999).
40. The absence of a clear proof structure has also provoked an abundance of commentary
addressing the interpretation of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Ruth Colker,
Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001);
Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1423 (1991).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
43. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
44. Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 258-59 (1st Cir. 2001).
45. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1995).
46. Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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existence of alternative approaches." In fact, the Court is of the opinion
that the only significant difference between the circuit courts' various
approaches is the language used to employ them, because "their results
are functionally similar." 8 This is a questionable position to take given
that the Court fails to examine even one outcome in light of the differing
approaches.
Moreover, the
proof structure for reasonable
accommodation cases set by the majority is vague in itself, lending little
clarity to an already complex and confusing issue of statutory
interpretation.49
The two basic models of burden allocation created pre-Barnett are
shifting burdens of proof5 ° and traditional burdens of proof.5' In the
traditional burdens model, the plaintiff must plead the requisite elements
of a prima facie case, and, having succeeded, the defendant then has the
opportunity to refute any of those elements or plead an affirmative
defense.5 2 In contrast, in the burden-shifting model, there are shifting
burdens of production53 and shifting burdens of persuasion. While each
of these models has its own advantages and disadvantages, the different
standards imposed on plaintiffs in reasonable accommodation claims
indicates that the ADA is not being implemented consistently with its
aims."
Furthermore, the creation of different standards and proof structures
has had adverse effects on employees bringing such claims. Notably, an
empirical study conducted over a six-year period after the statute was
enacted shows that employers overwhelmingly prevailed in employment

47. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1523.
48. Id. The following analysis of the diverging methods will show that this is not the case.
49. In addition, the standard set by the majority for reassignment cases involving bona fide
seniority systems in a union setting is also unclear. The Court ultimately held that a legitimate
seniority system will usually trump a disabled employee's request for reassignment as a method of
reasonably accommodating the employee's disability regardless of the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement, unless the employee can show special circumstances warranting the
reassignment to supercede the seniority system. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1523-25; see also Vikram
David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Reasonable Accommodations Under the ADA: The Supreme Court
in Barnett, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 361 (2002).
50. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995).
51. Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282 (11 th Cir. 1997).
52. Reed, 244 F.3d at 258-59; Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 681-83 (5th Cir.
1996).
53. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999) (shifting the burden of
production).
54. Jackan v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 562 (2d Cir. 2000) (shifting the burden of
persuasion).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000) (listing the ADA's goals).
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discrimination cases at the appellate as well as the trial court level5 6
Congress could not have intended this result in drafting the ADA.57
Rather, the ADA was enacted to be a "comprehensive national
mandate"58 invoking the "sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce,
in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities."5' 9
The following examines the two general methods of burden
allocation created by the circuit courts pre-Barnett, and argues that
employees should not be forced to prove the unreasonableness of a
proposed accommodation.
A. Shifting Burdens
The first general approach to burden allocation pre-Barnett involves
shifting either the burden of production or persuasion between the
parties. The employee must carry the initial burden of proof; if the
employee is successful, the burden then shifts to the employer.
Depending upon which party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion,
the burden might then shift back to the employee.
"The burden-shifting model was introduced into employment law
in order to allow indirect proof of the often elusive 'intent' to
discriminate." 6 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,6' the Supreme
Court set the standard for burden allocation in discrimination claims

56. Colker, supra note 3, at 99-103, 107 (1999) (noting that between July 1992 and July 1998,
employers won 93% of employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial court
level, and 84% of such claims on appeal).
57. Consider how broadly the ADA defines disability in conjunction with the statute's stated
purpose. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability) with 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (detailing
the purpose of the ADA). See also Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases:
A Choice of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071 (1999) (arguing for a broader interpretation of
disability under the ADA to protect more individuals from discrimination than those traditionally
"
viewed as disabled). "The ADA is a shield against discrimination on the basis of disability ....
Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 705 (4th Cir. 2001). It was not intended to be
used by non-disabled employees as a sword against their employers. See id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
59. Id. § 12101(b)(4).
60. Reed, 244 F.3d at 259 n.3.
61. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For discussion of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach
to discrimination claims under the ADA, see Lianne C. Knych, Assessing the Application of
McDonnell Douglas to Employment Discrimination Claims Brought Under the Americans With
DisabilitiesAct, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (1995) (arguing against adoption of the burden-shifting
model in ADA employment discrimination claims).
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under Title VII.62 Several circuit courts adopted the burden-shifting
approach for reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA,
including the Second, 63 Third, 6' Eighth and Tenth6 6 circuits.
1. Shifting Burdens of Production
In Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,67 the Eighth Circuit
adopted a method of burden allocation that shifts the burden of
production between the parties, while imposing the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the employee.65 Specifically, the court required the
employee to make "a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is
possible[J" then shifted; the burden of production to the employer to
show either that it is "unable to accommodate" the employee or that the
employee could not perform the essential functions of the job even with
a reasonable accommodation. 69 Then the burden shifts back to the
employee to rebut the employer's evidence with proof of the employee's
individual capabilities. ° Proving one's individual ability to perform the
job with an accommodation is a critical step in the process of litigating
reasonable accommodation claims. It is noteworthy that other circuits
did not expressly provide for such an inquiry.
In White v. York International Corp., the Tenth Circuit also
adopted a burden-shifting model similar to that taken in Fjellestad.n

62. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05.
63. Borkowski, 63 F.3d 131 (adopting the burden-shifting model in a discrimination claim
under the Rehabilitation Act); Jackan, 205 F.3d .562 (applying the burden-shifting model adopted in
Borkowski to reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA).
64. Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 1999).
65. Fiellestad, 188 F.3d 944.
66. White, 45 F.3d 357.
67. 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999). Ms. Fjellestad was a Pizza Hut unit manager whose
shoulder injuries from an automobile accident significantly limited her ability to perform her regular
duties. Id. at 947-48. The court concluded that these facts, along with the employer's failure to enter
into an interactive process to determine the possibility of reasonable accommodations, created
genuine issues of material fact warranting reversal of summary judgment. Id. at 957. This seems an
appropriate outcome for the appeal, given Ms. Fjellestad's genuine inability to perform her job's
essential functions without an accommodation where one is most likely available.
68. Id. at 950-51; Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995).
69. Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 950-51, citing Benson, 62 F.3d at 1112.
70. Benson, 62 F.3d at 1112.
71. 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995). Mr. White assembled commercial air conditioners, which
required lifting and continuous standing. Id. at 358-59. After suffering a debilitating injury requiring
his ankle to be immobilized, Mr. White was severely restricted in the work he could perform, and
was absent from work for long periods of time. Id. at 359. The Tenth Circuit ultimately affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer because Mr. White produced no
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The similarity lies in that the burden of production shifts once the
employee's burden is carried, yet the employee retains the ultimate
burden of persuasion.73 In the court's opinion, the employee's burden
only requires a "facial showing that accommodation is possible,"
whereupon the burden shifts to the employer.74 This proof structure
favors employees in that it does not force them to prove the
unreasonableness of the accommodation in their initial burden. Instead,
it is the employer who must conduct the unreasonableness part of the
inquiry by showing its inability to accommodate the employee." In
contrast, the Eighth Circuit requires the employee to address the element
of unreasonableness in making a facial showing that a reasonable
accommodation is possible in the initial burden. 76 Thus, the Eighth
Circuit's standard clearly makes it harder than that of the Tenth Circuit
for employees to win reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA.
To further a more equitable allocation of the burdens, courts should
recognize that employees generally do not have access to the employer's
records or knowledge of the employer's ability to finance a proposed
accommodation.77 Without this information, an employee may not know
the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation, therefore, it would be
unduly burdensome to expect the employee to prove it at trial. For this
reason, the Tenth Circuit's proof structure gives employees a more
equitable opportunity to bring reasonable accommodation claims,
whereas other proof structures create more obstacles for employees.
2. Shifting Burdens of Persuasion
In an alternative interpretation of the ADA's allocation of burdens
of proof pre-Barnett, the Second and Third Circuits were unique in
holding that the proof structure in reasonable accommodation cases
involves a shifting burden of persuasion. In Borkowski v. Valley Central

evidence that an accommodation was possible. Id. at 363. This seems a fair outcome since no
accommodation was even offered into evidence.
72. Id. at 361.
73. White, 45 F.3d at 361.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 361.
76. Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 950.
77. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd sub nom. US
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002) ("Employees do not have at their disposal the
extensive information concerning possible alternative positions or possible accommodations which
employers have.").
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School District,8 the Second Circuit employed a shifting burden of
persuasion for the first time in a case involving the Rehabilitation Act.79
The employee's burden involved showing the existence of an effective
accommodation that would qualify her for the position, and then
"identifying an accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not
clearly exceed its benefits."' At this point, the burden of persuasion
shifted to the employer to attack the "reasonableness of the proposed
accommodation.., in making out an affirmative defense of undue
hardship" by way of a "common-sense balancing of the costs and
benefits in light of the factors listed in the regulations ....
Subsequently, the Second Circuit expressly applied this standard to
reasonable accommodation cases under the ADA in Jackan v. New York
State Department of Labor.2 The court also clarified its earlier ruling in
Borkowski, 3 stating that the employee bears both the burden of
production and of persuasion in proving the existence of an
accommodation, and bears a burden of production in proving that the
accommodation is reasonable.84 If the employee succeeds, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the employer to prove the accommodation is
unreasonable.85 Thus, like the Eighth Circuit's decision in Fjellestad,6
the Second Circuit also forced the employee to make a showing of the
unreasonableness of the proposed accommodation. 87

78. 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995). A motor vehicle accident left Ms. Borkowski, a school
teacher, with memory loss, an inability to concentrate, reduced balance, coordination and mobility.
Id. at 134. She was ultimately terminated as the result of alleged poor performance. Id. The Second
Circuit held she presented a valid case because she had known disabilities and the school terminated
her without considering whether those disabilities could be accommodated. Id. at 135, 144.
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
80. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139.
81. Id. at 140.
82. 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 931 (2000). Mr. Jackan
proposed, but was denied, reassignment to his old desk job as an accommodation for his back pain,
which stemmed from spinal cord surgery to correct injuries he sustained in a motorcycle accident.
Id. at 564.
83. 63 F.3d 131.
84. Jackan, 205 F.3d at 567.
85. Id. Using this standard, the court affirmed judgment in favor of the employer on the basis
that the employee failed to establish the existence of an appropriate vacancy. Id.
86. 188 F.3d 944.
87. Arguably, this requirement fails to consider employees who, through no fault of their
own, are genuinely unaware of other positions or accommodations that are available to them
elsewhere in the company. In fact, it is the employers that were given the burden of initiating the
interactive process in order to address the challenges of determining a reasonable accommodation.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2002). The interactive process was designed to "identify the precise
limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could
overcome those limitations." Id. Thus, it would clearly be inconsistent with the spirit of the
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Unfortunately for Mr. Jackan and similarly situated employees,
many circuit courts (and now the Supreme Court)8 agree with this
restriction on employees' ability to recover. Another among them is the
Third Circuit. In Walton v. Mental Health Association,"9 the Third
Circuit expressly followed the Second Circuit's decision in Borkowski,
stating that an employee bears a burden of persuasion to show an
effective accommodation exists that will enable the employee to perform
the job's essential functions.90 The employee also bears a burden of
production in identifying a reasonable accommodation whose costs do
not exceed its benefits.9' Satisfaction of these burdens by the employee
shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer to prove that the
proposed accommodation is unreasonable or that it would create an
undue hardship.92
B. TraditionalBurdens of Proof
The second general approach to burden allocation in reasonable
accommodation cases pre-Barnett is a more traditional approach in civil
litigation. Instead of shifting burdens between the parties, the employee
must simply plead the elements of a prima facie case of disability
discrimination to the satisfaction of the trier of fact. The employer then
has the opportunity to rebut any element(s) of the employee's prima
facie case, or to plead an affirmative defense. In the event the employer
pleads an affirmative defense, the employer bears the burden of
interactive process to require employers to initiate and engage in this informal preventive step, yet
require employees to prove what the employer discovers from undertaking it. Therefore, employees
should not be punished for their lack of knowledge of the employer's options.
88. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1523 (2002) (compelling employees to
show that "an 'accommodation' seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases").
89. 168 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 1999). Ms. Walton was the director of a program that provided
employment training and job placement for mental health services consumers who, in fact, suffered
from depression herself. Id. at 664. So severe was her illness that she required hospitalization for
amounts of time exceeding the eighteen sick days permitted annually for all but one of the four
years in which she was employed; she was eventually terminated for missing too much work after
requesting further leave of absence as an accommodation. Id. at 664-65. The court found for the
employer because continued leave of absence would have created an undue burden on the employer
at a time when the program she directed was in decline and required an active director to maintain
government funding. Id. at 664, 671. Although this outcome appears harsh, it is a fair one in light of
the necessity for progress in a declining program.
90. Id. at 670 (quoting Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139).
91. Walton, 168 F.3d at 670.
92. Id. The court reasoned this to be a fair method of burden allocation since "the employee
knows whether her disability can be accommodated in a manner that will allow her to successfully
perform her job" and "[tihe employer.., holds the information necessary to determine whether the
proposed accommodation will create an undue burden for it." id.
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satisfying the defense's own unique set of elements or factors to be
considered. If the employer does not meet this burden, the defense is
lost.- The foregoing describes what this note refers to as traditional
burdens of proof.
Several courts adopted the traditional burden of proof method PreBarnett, including the First, 93 Fifth,94 Seventh, 95 Ninth,96 Eleventh 97 and
District of Columbia99 circuits. Most of the courts follow the same
method with slight variation in the quantum of proof required to carry a
party's burden.
In Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc.,99 the First Circuit rejected the
burden-shifting method for reasonable accommodation cases, opting for
traditional burdens of proof instead.' °° The court required the employee
to show "not only that the proposed accommodation would enable her to
perform the essential functions of her job, but also that, at least on the
face of things, it is feasible for the employer under the circumstances."'0 '
If the employee carries this burden, it is then up to the employer to show
that "the proposed accommodation is not as feasible as it appears but
rather that there are further costs to be considered, certain devils in the
details." ,02
The significance of the First Circuit's proof structure is that it
explicitly requires the employee to prove the feasibility of a proposed
accommodation. This is more than the Tenth Circuit requires, and is thus
more difficult for an employee to. meet.' 3 When contrasted with the

93. Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001).
94. Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 1996).
95. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
96. Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 220 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2000).
97. Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282 (1 lthCir. 1997).
98. Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
99. 244 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001). Ms. Reed had great difficulty addressing conflict situations
with coworkers as a result of bipolar disorder. Id. at 255. To prevent problems, Ms. Reed's
supervisors allowed her (and all their employees) to walk away from conflict situations with coworkers so that a supervisor could resolve the problem. Id. However, Ms. Reed never notified her
supervisors of her disability and was eventually terminated after becoming. enraged during a nonconflict situation; she cursed and threatened a human resources director although she had an
opportunity to walk away. Id. at 256. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the
employer on the grounds that Ms. Reed had never even notified her employer of the need for an
accommodation, and even if she had, she nevertheless failed to walk away from the situation as her
supervisors directed. Id. at 261-62.
100. Reed, 244 F.3d at 259.
101. id.

102. Id.
103.

White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995).
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burden-shifting models already discussed, it also clearly indicates that
all approaches to burden allocation are not functionally the same.'O,
In Barth v. Gelb, °5 the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the
application of the burden-shifting framework for reasonable
accommodation cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act. '°"The
court
required the employee to establish that: "(a) he is handicapped but, (b)
with reasonable accommodation (which he must describe), he is (c) able
'0 7
to perform the essential functions of the position he holds or seeks."
If the employee satisfies this burden, the employer then has the
opportunity to rebut the evidence.0 The employer may plead the
affirmative defense of undue hardship, but it must bear the burden of
proof.'O9 The District of Columbia Circuit later applied Barth's
traditional burdens of proof method to reasonable accommodation cases
under the ADA in Aka v. Washington Hospital Center."

104. Contra Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1522-23; Reed, 244 F.3d at 259. The First Circuit and the
Supreme Court are both of the opinion that all methods of burden allocation are functionally the
same, yet the Barnett and Reed decisions fail to consider the Tenth Circuit's decision in White and
other decisions that are analytically separate from the same few cases cited by both courts. Barnett,
122 S. Ct. at 1522-23; Reed, 244 F.3d at 259; White, 45 F.3d at 361.
105. 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The court ultimately concluded that the employee, Mr.
Barth, was validly denied an overseas assignment because the employer satisfied its undue hardship
defense with evidence proving the proposed accommodation would have resulted in loss of essential
operational flexibility. Id. at 1188-89.
106. Id. at 1187-89. Notably, the court perceived three distinct types of disability
discrimination claims and assigned special standards for analyzing each: (1) where the employer
claims non-discriminatory reasons for its adverse employment action; (2) where the employer
maintains that the employee is not an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, or that no
reasonable accommodation is available, so that the employee falls outside the scope of ADA
protection; and (3) where the employer offers the affirmative undue hardship defense for its actions.
Id. at 1186-87.
107. Id. at 1186.
108. Barth, 2 F.3d at 1186-87.
109. Id. The employer's success or failure in meeting its burden should be analyzed in light of
the factors enumerated in the statute. Id. For the ADA's list of factors to be considered when
analyzing the viability of an employer's undue hardship defense, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10)(B)
(2000).
110. 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Mr. Aka was an operating room orderly who requested
reassignment to a different position because it was no longer prudent for him to exert physical force
after a bypass surgery, but he was continually rejected for other open positions at the hospital
although he was qualified and had seniority. Id. at 1286-88. The District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer citing to triable issues of
fact as to whether the hospital was required to reassign Mr. Aka under the circumstances. Id. at
1305-06. It seems peculiar that the Supreme Court failed to consider this case in Barnett and instead
elected to consider only Barth, despite the similar implications regarding reassignment under the
ADA instead of the Rehabilitation Act where the scope of permissible reassignment provided for by
a collective bargaining agreement was at issue.
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In Riel v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.," the Fifth Circuit

assigned traditional burdens of proof to parties litigating reasonable
accommodation claims Under the ADA, stating "[t]he employee must
show that the employer failed to implement a reasonable

accommodation, and the employer may defend by showing business
necessity or undue burden."' 2 The court followed the Barth opinion in
requiring that the proposed accommodation be reasonable "in the run of
cases," and that the undue hardship analysis is focused on the burden

imposed by the employee's preferred accommodation in light of the
employer's particular business." 3
The Ninth Circuit also opted for traditional burdens of proof pre-4

Barnett as seen in Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc."
The court required employees to make a prima facie showing that a
reasonable accommodation was possible."5 The employer then had to
show that the proposed accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the running of the business." 6 The court ultimately affirmed

summary judgment for the employer, reasoning that evidence of poor
111. 99 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 1996). In this particular case, Mr. Riel was a computer systems
engineer whose job performance suffered from fatigue he attributed to kidney problems and
diabetes, which often prevented him from meeting deadlines. Id. at 680-81. Although Mr. Riel
missed several deadlines designed to be checkpoints during the course of completing a project, he
never missed the final deadline. Id. at 680. After the employer's attempts to remedy the situation
and Mr. Riel's emergency appendectomy that discovered kidney failure, Mr. Riel proposed either
changing the deadline schedule or transferring to a job that didn't require deadlines, but was denied
on the basis of below-average performance reports and was fired. Id. at 681, 683. The Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer, finding triable issues of
fact regarding whether Mr. Riel's medical condition was a disability and whether meeting the
deadlines constituted an essential job function. Id. at 683-84. The court remanded for consideration
whether Mr. Riel's proposed accommodations were reasonable. Riel, 99 F.3d at 683-84. Notably,
the court also distinguished disability discrimination from other forms of employment
discrimination, observing, for example, that while race discrimination statutes mandate equality of
treatment, disability discrimination statutes would punish such behavior in efforts to obtain
accommodating treatment for the disabled. Id. at 681.
112. Id.at682.
113. Id. at 683 (citing Barth, 2 F.3d at 1187).
114. 220 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2000). Ms. Braunling was an underwriting supervisor who
suffered from multiple sclerosis, which caused her extreme fatigue and dizziness as well as
sensitivity to light, heat, humidity and stress. Id. at 1155. Ms. Braunling Was terminated after she
failed to perform at the required level following a transfer she requested to a higher position within
the company that resulted in more stress, difficulties with her new supervisor, and reduced
performance. Id. at 1155-56.
115. Id. at 1157.
116. Id. (citing Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993) (utilizing
traditional burdens of proof in reasonable accommodation cases under the Rehabilitation Act)).
The court also noted an unresolved dispute within the Ninth Circuit as to whether the employee has
the burden of showing a specific reasonable accommodation exists that is available to the employer
as part of the employee's prima facie case. Braunling, 220 F.3d at 1157 n. 2.
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performance unrelated to the employee's disability were adequate
grounds for her termination." 7
In Willis v. Conopco, Inc.,"' the Eleventh Circuit also adopted
Barth's traditional burdens of proof approach for reasonable
accommodation cases. "9The court iterated a proof structure in which the
employee must describe the particular accommodation that would enable
him to perform the essential functions of the job.'20 Once the employee
has done this, "it would then be up to the employ[er] ...to refute that
evidence."' 2 ' As seen in the other models, the employee retains the
ultimate burden of persuasion.122
The foregoing cases discussing the allocation of traditional burdens
of proof illustrate the split amongst the federal circuit courts over burden
allocation pre-Barnett. Some courts utilized a burden-shifting method
while others employed traditional burdens of proof. Although they
utilized differing proof structures, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth, Eleventh and District of Columbia circuits required the employee
to make a showing of the unreasonableness of the proposed
accommodation. On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit did not impose
this obligation.

117. Braunling, 220 F.3d at 1157-58.
118. 108 F.3d 282 (llth Cir. 1997).
119. Id. at 284-85. When blood tests confirmed Ms. Willis' exposure to certain enzymes in the
laundry detergent her employer packages and sells caused allergic reactions in her lungs and on her
skin, she was reassigned to another area of the plant her employer's air quality testing determined to
be safe for her. Id. at 283-84. In addition to air quality testing, other efforts the employer made to
accommodate Ms. Willis included directing her to wear a mask when she was in enzyme-enriched
areas of the plant, providing her with a parking pass which allowed her to avoid unsafe areas, and
excusing her from performing her normal duties and attending meetings in unsafe areas. Id. at 283.
However, after an unrelated medical leave nearly two years later, Ms. Willis refused to return to
work unless she was reassigned to a safer work area or her employer install air conditioning in the
area of the plant where she worked. Id. at 283-84. Ms. Willis was eventually terminated when her
employer's pulmonologist determined she could work and she again refused. Willis, 108 F.3d at
284. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer, concluding the employee
failed to offer competent evidence regarding the availability of a reassignment within the company,
and that her only other proposed accommodation (installing air conditioning to alleviate exposure to
allergenic enzymes) would not be effective. Id. at 286-87. The court further noted that "[w]hen an
employee refuses to show up for work after being informed that her failure to do so will result in the
loss of her job, the employer has presented a valid, nonretaliatory reason for terminating that
employee." Id. at 287 (citation omitted).
120. Id. at 284
121. Id. (quoting Barth, 2 F.3d at 1186).
122. Willis, 108 F.3d at 284.
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In Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration,2 1 the
Seventh Circuit interpreted the ADA to assign traditional burdens of
proof as well.'24 The court held that:
[t]he employee must show that the accommodation is reasonable in the
sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs. Even if this
prima facie showing is made, the employer has an opportunity to prove
that upon more careful consideration the costs are excessive in relation
either to the benefits of the accommodation or to the employer's
financial survival or health.'25

Thus, the Seventh Circuit imposed upon employees the burden of
showing not only the effectiveness of the proposed accommodation, but
also the proportionality of its cost to the employer.
Expecting an employee to know the employer's ability to finance
either the proposed accommodation or other available alternatives is too
demanding an imposition. Employees should not be expected to weigh
any proposed accommodation against alternatives an employee may not
be aware of. While employees are in a better position to assess which
among the possible accommodations would be most effective, it is the
employer who knows best its ability to finance the "range of possible
positions and can more easily perform analyses regarding the 'essential
functions' of each ....
Therefore, from a practical view, the burden
of showing unreasonableness rests more equitably with the employer.'27
123. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995). A spinal cord tumor that paralyzed Ms. Vande Zande from
the waist down left her in a wheelchair and suffering from pressure ulcers, which often required her
to stay at home for several weeks at a time. Id. at 542-43. While her employer made numerous
accommodations for her disability, she nevertheless complained about having to use sixteen and one
half hours of sick leave while working nearly full time from home during an eight-week period, and
her employer's refusal to install sinks in the office's kitchenette at a height of thirty-four inches
instead of thirty-six. Id. at 544-46. Among the accommodations Ms. Vande Zande's employer made
for her disability were having bathrooms modified, steps turned into a ramp, buying special
adjustable furniture, paying half the cost for a cot she needed for personal care, adjusting her
schedule to accommodate medical appointments and making plan changes to a new locker room. Id.
at 544. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
employer, finding that an employer is not required allow a disabled employee to work alone without
supervision at home, and that Ms. Vande Zande's employer did not have a duty to modify the sink's
height since another one was conveniently located andeasily accessible to her. Id. at 546.
124. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543.
125. Id. The court also concluded that an employer satisfies the duty of reasonably
accommodating disabled employees when it does what is necessary to enable the disabled employee
to work in reasonable comfort. Id. at 546.
126. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd sub nom. US
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
127. Contrast this approach with the Tenth Circuit's pre-Barnett, which only required the
employee to facially show that a proposed accommodation is possible. White, 45 F.3d at 361.
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C. Burden-shifting and TraditionalBurdens, Depending Upon the
Type of Evidence Available
Uniquely, the Sixth Circuit adopted both methods of burden
allocation; the method applied depends on whether the employee has
either direct or circumstantial evidence of the employer's discrimination.
In Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.,2 ' the Sixth Circuit clearly
laid out distinct standards for both scenarios.'2 9 Traditional burdens of
proof were assigned where the employee had direct evidence and the

employer admitted discrimination:
1) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he or she is
"disabled."
2) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he or she is
"otherwise qualified" for the position despite his or her disability:
a) without accommodation from the employer; b) with an alleged
"essential" job requirement eliminated; or c) with a proposed
reasonable accommodation.
3) The employer will bear the burden of proving that a challenged job
criterion is essential, and therefore a business necessity, or that a
proposed accommodation will impose an undue hardship upon the
employer."3
In contrast, the court assigned the burden-shifting method to cases in
which the employee has only circumstantial proof of the employer's

discrimination:
[T]he plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing that: 1) he or she is disabled; 2) otherwise qualified for the
position, with or without reasonable accommodation; 3) suffered an
128. 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996). Mr. Monette was Electronic Data System's only customer
service representative at the store where he worked, but was injured one day when a television and
videocassette recorder he was delivering fell on him. Id. at 1176. Upon his return from eight months
medical leave, he learned his position had been filled and was unwilling to transfer to other stores.
Id. at 1176-77. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that
it is unreasonable for an employer to have to offer unpaid leave of absence until another position
becomes available. Id. at 1187-89.
129. For Sixth Circuit cases following the traditional method of burden allocation which
requires direct proof of discrimination, see Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2001);
Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriffs Dep't, 227 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2000). For Sixth Circuit cases
following the burden-shifting method which requires only circumstantial proof, see Doren v. Battle
Creek Health Sys., 187 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir.
1998).
130. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186.
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adverse employment decision; 4) the employer knew or had reason to
know of the plaintiff's disability; and 5) the position remained open
while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual
was replaced. The defendant must then offer a legitimate explanation
for its action. If the defendant satisfies this burden of production, the
plaintiff must introduce evidence showing that the proffered
explanation is pretextual. Under this scheme, the plaintiff retains the
ultimate burden of persuasion at all times. '3
Thus, the Sixth Circuit uniquely utilizes both traditional and
shifting burdens of proof in reasonable accommodation cases. The factor
determining which model should be used depends upon the strength of
the employee's evidence of discrimination.'32
D. Pre-Barnett CircuitCourt Summary and Argument
The foregoing illustrates the different approaches taken by the
Circuit Courts of Appeals with regard to allocating burdens of proof in
reasonable accommodation cases under the ADA pre-Barnett.
The Second, Third, Eighth and Tenth Circuits utilized shifting burdens,
whereas the First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh and District of
Columbia Circuits utilized traditional burdens of proof. The Sixth
Circuit actually used both, depending upon whether the employee has
direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.
The Tenth Circuit's standard is the most favorable to employees,
since it does not require an employee to show the unreasonableness of a
proposed accommodation. Conversely, the Seventh Circuit's standard is
the most burdensome, since it requires employees to show not only the
proposed accommodation's effectiveness, but also its proportionality to
cost. The remaining circuits also force employees to make a showing of
the unreasonableness of the proposed accommodation, but require less
proof of employees than the Seventh Circuit. Notably, the EEOC's
position has not been adopted in any circuit although administrative
guidance should be regarded as carrying the force of law, or should at
131. Id. at 1186-87 (footnote omitted).
132. Id. It is notable that the Fourth Circuit has also opted for a shifting burden of production
approach founded upon the McDonnell Douglas opinion and its progeny. Halperin v. Abacus Tech.
Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit's approach is similar to that of the
Sixth Circuit in that the strength of the employee's evidence of discrimination is critical to the
analysis of whether the employer must provide a reasonable accommodation. See id.; Monette, 90
F.3d at 1186-87. However, the Fourth Circuit's approach will not be discussed further because it
squarely follows the McDonnell Douglas framework without implementing a unique proof structure
that applies solely in reasonable accommodation claims. See Halprin, 128 F.3d at 196-97.
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least merit some deference. The next section illustrates how judicial
deference to the EEOC's views would create a uniform proof structure.
However, it will also illustrate an inherent flaw in the EEOC's
interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.
IV.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE

EEOC

AND IT'S INTERPRETATIONS OF

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP

When Congress enacted the ADA, it delegated varying degrees of
authority to administrative agencies in regard to the different titles of the3
statute. 33 The EEOC,13 established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1
was given the authority to issue regulations and to administer, interpret
and enforce Title I of the ADA. 3 6 Following Congress' mandate, on July
26, 1991, the EEOC published final rules ("regulations") 37 to enforce the
ADA, which contained an appendix entitled, Interpretive Guidance on
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("Interpretative
Guidance"). 3 The EEOC further discussed its interpretation of Title I in
an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the plaintiff-employee in Reed v.
LePage Bakeries, Inc. ' Under administrative law, the EEOC's

133. The Supreme Court recognized the various agencies that are delegated authority in regard
to the ADA:
the EEOC has authority to issue regulations to carry out the employment provisions in
Title I of the ADA, §§ 12111-12117, pursuant to § 12116 .... The Attorney General is
granted authority to issue regulations with respect to Title 11, subtitle A, §§ 1213112134, which relates to public services .... Finally, the Secretary of Transportation has
authority to issue regulations pertaining to the transportation provisions of Titles II and
III. See § 12149(a) .... See also § 12204 (granting authority to the Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to issue minimum guidelines to supplement
the existing Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design). Moreover,
each of these agencies is authorized to offer technical assistance regarding the provisions
they administer. See § 12206 (c)(1) ....
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478-79 (1999).
134. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Enforcement Activities, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/enforce.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) ("the EEOC coordinates all federal
equal employment opportunity regulations, practices, and policies. The Commission interprets
employment discrimination laws, monitors the federal sector employment discrimination program,
provides funding and support to state and local Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs), and
sponsors outreach and technical assistance programs.")
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2000).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12116(2000).
137. 29C.F.R§ 1630 (2002).
138. 29 C.F.R § app. 1630.1-16.
139. EEOC's Amicus Brief, supra note 13.
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regulations regarding Title I of the Act should carry the force of4 law. 4 °
1
At a minimum, the Interpretive Guidance merits some deference.1
Courts have not deferred to the EEOC regulations and guidance for
various reasons: (1) the agency's perceived pro-employee bias; 42 (2) the
EEOC regulations regarding reasonable accommodations and undue
hardship are beyond the scope of the agency's authority;' 43 and (3) the
44
EEOC's regulations are impermissible constructions of the ADA.
The lack of deference to the EEOC's interpretations of the ADA
weakens the agency's power and authoritative force. Deference to the
EEOC regulations and guidance would create a uniform application of
the ADA. In addition, parties to litigation and practitioners would be
able to rely confidently upon the EEOC's well informed views.
However, the EEOC's views, at least as advocated in Reed and Barnett,
were inherently flawed. This section will attempt to establish the extent
of the EEOC's authority in relation to Title I of the ADA.
A. The Pre-BarnettEra and Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc.: The EEOC
Voices its Interpretationof Burden Allocation Under the ADA
As the ADA conveys, an employer's legal obligation to provide
reasonable accommodations is limited to the extent to which an
accommodation would cause an employer undue hardship. ' According
to the EEOC's regulations and Interpretive Guidance, methods of
reasonable accommodation that a qualified individual is afforded under
the ADA can be catagorized into three groups: (1) changes to the job
application process; (2) changes to the work environment, or to the way
a job is usually performed; and (3) changes that enable an employee with
benefits and privileges of employment (such
a disability to enjoy equal
46
training).
to
as access

140. See infra Part IV.B. The lack of deference to EEOC guidance exhibits the agency's
second-class status. Locke, supra note 5, at 108.
141. See infra Part IV.B.
142. There seems to be a conflict when the EEOC sues an employer on behalf of an employee
and cites its own regulations and views as the authority the court is required to follow.
143. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999). The "[lhack of regard for the
EEOC's authority stems from the limited mandate provided the agency under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, a status that has made courts disinclined to give deference to its civil rights regulations."
Barnes, Allison, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263, 288 (2001) (citations omitted).
144. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1522-23 (2002).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(A) (2000).
146. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2002); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
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Regrettably, reasonable accommodation is not specifically defined
under the ADA; rather, the statute only offers examples of what a
reasonable accommodation may include.14 The ADA states that a
reasonable accommodation may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modifications of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities."'
As a result, the interpretation of reasonable accommodation is left to
agency or judicial interpretations.
The EEOC regulations used the same language in its interpretation
of what a reasonable accommodation may include. 4 9 But according to
the EEOC, reasonable accommodation also means:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that
enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the
position such qualified applicant desires; or
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the
manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is
customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a
disability to perform the essential functions of that position; or
(iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's
employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of
employment as are 5enjoyed
by its other similarly situated employees
0
without disabilities. 1

The foregoing provisions essentially illustrate methods of
accommodations that are deemed reasonable by the EEOC.''
The EEOC's Interpretative Guidance further clarified the agency's view
of what is reasonable by stating that:
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
148. Id. § 12111(9)(A)-(B).
149. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o)(2)(i).
150. Id. § 1630.2 (o)(1)(i)-(iii).
151. Congress only indicated what reasonable accommodation may include. 42 U.S.C.
§12111(9) (2000). The EEOC tried to fill this gap by listing methods of accommodation that it
considers reasonable.
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if an adjustment or modification is job-related, e.g., specifically assists
the individual in performing the duties of a particular job, it will be
considered a type of reasonable accommodation. On the other hand, if
an adjustment or modification assists the individual throughout his or
her daily activities, on and off the job, it will be considered a personal
item that the employer is not required to provide. 52
Read together, the EEOC's regulations and Interpretive Guidance
define a reasonable accommodation as one that is both job-related and
effective. However, this approach was not advocated in Reed.'53 In Reed,
the EEOC advocated that reasonable accommodation in the employment
context only refers to whether a proposed accommodation enables an
employee to effectively perform the job. 5 4 In Barnett, the Supreme
Court only considered the EEOC's regulations, and failed to consider the
effect that reading the regulations together with the Interpretive
Guidance would have on formulating a proof structure.'55 Reading the
regulations and the Interpretive Guidance together would arguably foster
an equitable and logical proof structure. 16
The EEOC regulations also expanded upon the ADA's definition of
undue hardship.'57 Notably, the history of the EEOC's regulations points
out that the agency purposefully "deleted the reference to undue
hardship from the definition of reasonable accommodation" which is "a
technical change reflecting that undue hardship is a defense to, rather
than an aspect of reasonable accommodation."'58 The EEOC regulations
state that undue hardship with respect to providing accommodations
means "significant difficulty or expense incurred by a covered entity"'59
in light of several factors, which include:

152. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
153. EEOC's Amicus Brief, supra note 13.
154. Id.
155. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1522-23.
156. In Barnett, the Supreme Court rejected the EEOC's view embodied in the Reed Amicus
Brief and the regulations because they would only require that a reasonable accommodation be
effective. Id. The Court may be more likely to accept a proof structure in which the Interpretive
Guidance's job-relatedness requirement is added to the effectiveness requirement to make a twopronged burden for the employee to satisfy. Regrettably, the EEOC did not argue for such a twopronged requirement in Reed because the employee in that case probably would not have been able
to meet the job-relatedness prong. EEOC's Amicus Brief, supra note 13 at 3-16.
157. Compare 42 U.S.C § 12111(10) (2000) with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
158. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals With Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35726
(July 26, 1991) (emphasis added).
159. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1).
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(i) The nature and net cost of the accommodation needed under this
part, taking into consideration the availability of tax credits and
deductions, and/or outside funding;
(ii) The overall financial resources of the facility or facilities
involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation, the
number of persons employed at such facility, and the effect on
expenses and resources;
(iii) The overall financial resources of the covered entity, the
overall size of the business of the covered entity with respect to the
number of its employees, and the number, type and location of its
facilities;
(iv) The type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure and functions of the workforce of
such entity, and the geographic separateness and administrative or
fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity; and
(v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the
facility, including the impact on the ability of other employees to
perform their duties and the impact on the facility's ability to conduct
business.' 60
Thus, the EEOC advocates the term undue hardship as referring to the
influence a proposed accommodation can have on the employer in light
of factors such as a business' size, financial resources and the nature and
structure of its operation.
In the EEOC's amicus brief in Reed, 162 the agency contended that
the district court imposed an unduly heavy burden on the plaintiff and
urged the court to clarify the ADA's standards by finding that "an ADA
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that a proposed accommodation
would be effective; to avoid liability, the employer must then show that it

160. Id. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i)-(v).
161. Id. § 1630.2(p)(2).
162. EEOC's Amicus Brief, supra note 13. In essence, the proof structure endorsed by the
EEOC can be broken down as follows: the employee should bear the initial burden of establishing
that an accommodation exists that would be effective and would allow the employee to perform the
essential job functions. Id. To rebut the employee's claim, the defense can either offer evidence
showing the accommodation would be ineffective or raise the affirmative defense of undue
hardship. Id. The plaintiff's only burden in proving a reasonable accommodation is to show that the
accommodation would effectively enable the employee to perform the job. Id. Whether the
accommodation would cause an undue hardship (is too costly or difficult) is entirely for the
defendant to prove. Id. See generally White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995)
(offering a proof structure similar to the one advocated by the EEOC).
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has offered an effective accommodation
or that such accommodation
1 63
hardship."
undue
an
cause
would
Ultimately, the EEOC views the burden of proving the
unreasonableness of. proposed accommodations as falling upon the
employer.'6 The reasoning for the EEOC's conclusion is that employees
can better determine what accommodation will work best for them, so
they should have the burden of proving an effective accommodation
exists.' 65 In addition, since an employer has greater access to information
about whether a particular accommodation will cause an undue hardship,
the employer should have the burden of proving
it in litigation, as
66
opposed to the employee proving its absence.
The First Circuit rejected the EEOC's position, 67 and the Supreme
Court impliedly rejected it in Barnett.16 As the Supreme Court pointed
out, the EEOC's proof structure is flawed in two respects. First, "in
ordinary English the word 'reasonable' does not mean 'effective.' It is
the word 'accommodation,' not the word 'reasonable,' that conveys the
need for effectiveness.' ' 69 Second, "a demand for an effective
accommodation could prove unreasonable because of its impact, not on
business operations, but on fellow employees ....""' Significantly,
there is no indication in the Barnett opinion that the Court considered
reading the EEOC's regulations together with its Interpretive Guidance
to formulate that a -reasonable accommodation is one that is both jobrelated and effective. Such a reading would negate the Court's analysis
that the EEOC's views are impermissible constructions of the ADA.
B. Giving Deference to the EEOC's Guidance
It is settled law that "the well-reasoned views of the agencies
implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance . . . . "' However, the courts' failure to defer to the EEOC on

163. EEOC's Amicus Brief, supra note 13 (emphasis added).
164. See id.
165. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1522-23; EEOC's Amicus Brief, supra note 13.
166. Barnett, 122 S.Ct. 1522-23; EEOC's Amicus Brief, supra note 13.
'167. Reed, 244 F.3d at 258.
168. 122 S.Ct. 1516, 1522-23 (rejecting the plaintiff s practical reading of the statute, which
was consistent with the EEOC's view in Reed).
169. Id.at 1522.
170. Id.
171. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). The inconsistency in
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numerous occasions has put the agency's authority in doubt.
The following discussion will illustrate when the courts are bound to an
agency's interpretation of a statute7 2 by analyzing Skidmore v. Swift &
Co. ,' 3 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council174 and
United States,v. Mead Corp.'75 A review of these cases will show that the
EEOC's views should be afforded more weight in reasonable
accommodation cases as a matter of law.
In Mead, the Supreme Court affirmed Skidmore in holding that "an
agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form,
given the 'specialized experience and broader investigations and
information' available to the agency .... Thus, under Mead and
Skidmore, the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance and amicus curiae brief in
Reed should be persuasive to a court trying to settle the terms reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship. 77
Conversely, "administrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."7 8
In Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for
judicial interpretation of an agency's statutory regulations.7 First, a
court must determine if "Congress has directly spoken to the precise
court rulings and the ever-evolving interpretation of the ADA make it critical for practitioners to
rely upon the most recent decisions in disability discrimination law. Churchill, supra note 20, at 13
(noting that disability discrimination "is not an area of the law that tolerates well a reliance on any
but the most recent cases" and that attorneys must pay close attention to constantly evolving law).
172. As the Supreme Court has expressed:
[jiudicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the statutes
it is authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and
judicial branches ....When Congress, through express delegation or the introduction of
an interpretive gap, in the statutory structure, has delegated policymaking authority to an
administrative agency, the extent of judicial review of the agency's policy
determinations is limited.
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (citations omitted).
173. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
174. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
175. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
176. Id. at 234 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139) (emphasis added). The degree of deference
the courts will afford an agency's interpretation of a statute varies with circumstances. Id. at 228.
In determining the amount of deference, courts have considered the extent of the agency's care, the
validity of its reasoning and the consistency of the agency's interpretations, amongst other factors.
Id.
177. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
178. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.
179. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
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question at issue."' 8 ° If so, an administrative agency's guidance will not
be given Chevron deference.'8' When Congress has not addressed the
precise question at issue and an administrative agency has the authority
to regulate the statute, courts must defer to an agency's interpretation of82
the statute if it is "based on a permissible construction of the statute.'
Therefore, unless the EEOC's regulations in regard to reasonable
accommodation or undue hardship are "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute[,]" a reviewing court must defer to the
EEOC's interpretation. 83
In Barnett, the Supreme Court impliedly found the EEOC's
regulations to be an impermissible construction of the ADA without
performing formal Chevron or Skidmore analyses. 8 4 However, if the
Court read the EEOC's regulations together with what should have been
considered persuasive Interpretive Guidance, the Court may have
concluded that both the job-relatedness and effectiveness requirements
in one proof structure would constitute a permissible construction of the
ADA.
C. Supportfor the EEOC's Interpretationof the ADA
The ADA's express language and the notion that employees should
not be forced to prove the unreasonableness of proposed
accommodations support the conclusion that the EEOC's view of what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation and an undue hardship are
permissible constructions of the ADA.
First, the burden of proving undue hardship is essentially a burden
of proving the unreasonableness of a proposed accommodation, which
the ADA has squarely placed on the employer. The ADA clearly states
that a punishable form of disability discrimination is "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant
or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity .... ,,85 This language plainly requires
the employer (covered entity) to carry its burden of proof (demonstrate)
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id. at 842-43.
id.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1522-23.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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that the employee's proposed accommodation would be unreasonable in
terms of expense or impact (impose an undue hardship) on the operation
of its business. Thus, proving the existence of a job-related, effective
accommodation is a burden analytically distinct from arguing that it is
unreasonable under the circumstances. Since undue hardship and
reasonable accommodation are not mirror images, the reasonableness
prong of the employee's case must mean something other than proving
economic hardship caused by a proposed accommodation. As the
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance suggests, reasonableness is thus satisfied
by an employee showing that the accommodation sought is job-related
in the context of employment situations under Title I. In other words, the
accommodation sought cannot be "primarily for the personal benefit of
the individual with a disability."'8 6 It is not the employer's duty to fully
reconcile the employee's disability. "Accordingly, an employer would
generally not be required to provide an employee with a disability with a
prosthetic limb, wheelchair, or eyeglasses. Nor would an employer have
to provide as an accommodation any amenity or convenience that is not
job-related .... ,,87
Next, the EEOC's regulations require the interactive process to be
initiated and pursued by the employer. 88 It is clear from the EEOC's
regulations that it is the employer who must oversee this informal
process aimed at "identify[ing] the precise limitations resulting from the
disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome
those limitations."'89 The employee must identify his disability and the
employer must determine how to reasonably accommodate it. "Almost
all of the circuits to rule on the question have held that an employer has
a mandatory obligation to engage in the interactive process and that this
obligation is triggered either by the employee's request for
accommodation or by the employer's recognition of the need for
accommodation."'90 Therefore, employees should not be forced to prove
the unreasonableness of the accommodation if litigation becomes

186. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2002).
187. Id.
188. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
189. Id.
190. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002) (holding that the interactive process is
mandatory and must be initiated by the employer); see also Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188
F.3d 944, 952-54 (8th Cir. 1999); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 315-20 (3d Cir.
1999); Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285-87 (7th Cir. 1996); Taylor v.
Principal Fin. Group Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).
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necessary, because the employer should have realized the financial
effects of the proposed accommodation during the interactive process.
Finally, common sense also dictates that employees should not be
required to prove the unreasonableness of proposed accommodations.
It is employers who know what they can afford, not employees.
An employee should not be expected to take its employer's ability to
finance a proposed accommodation into account. Furthermore,
employers know the range of positions available to a disabled employee
or applicant and know what job functions are essential. Armed with this
information, financial and other related business records, it is the
employer who knows best the unreasonableness of proposed or
alternative accommodations. Consequently, employees claiming
discrimination for the failure to reasonably. accommodate their disability
should not be required to make a showing of its unreasonableness.
The significance of this issue of statutory interpretation is that an
employer's obligation to provide reasonable accommodations to
qualified individuals. -isintegrally affected by the ADA's attempt to
define the terms reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. It is the
EEOC's place to reconcile these ambiguities in the ADA. If courts are
unwilling to afford Chevron deference, the EEOC's regulations and
Interpretative Guidance should at least be regarded as persuasive
authority.' 9' If the EEOC's interpretations of the ADA were given
deference, a uniform approach to burden allocation would result, and
practitioners and parties to litigation would have a clear and consistent
source of guidance.
V. CLARIFYING THE ADA THROUGH ANALOGY TO TITLE VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964192 prohibits employment
practices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.'93 As a respected predecessor, Title VII's caveat to
employers has been significant and influential enough to help form the
foundation of the ADA's prohibition of disability discrimination,
as well
94
as court interpretations of the ADA's proof structure.
191. In Meritor, a regulation that was deemed not controlling was still considered to
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance" Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citations omitted);
see also Petitioner's Brief, Sutton v. United Airlines, 1997 U.S. Briefs 1943 (1999).
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
193. Id. § 2000e-2.
194. Colker, supra note 40 (pointing out that the ADA's roots stem from Title VII and the
Rehabilitation Act). Several courts have employed the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting proof
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Much like the ADA, Title VII's ambiguity produced uncertainty
regarding the proper allocation of burdens of proof in discrimination
claims. In Title VII's case, this was due to the statute's failure to identify
proof structures that distinguish between direct and circumstantial
evidence. 95 Attempting to resolve this dilemma, the Supreme Court96
rendered landmark decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,'97 which set forth proof structures in
disparate treatment cases depending upon the strength of the employee's
evidence of discrimination.'"
However, several of the Supreme Court's employment law
decisions would soon come under scrutiny and be altered by Congress99
with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act").1
In particular, the 1991 Act made several important modifications to both
Title VH and the Price Waterhouse proof structure.
-First, section 703(m) of the 1991 Act clearly specified that a
complaining party need only demonstrate that race, color, religion, sex
or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment practice.' °°
This language adopts the plurality's view in Price Waterhouse but

structure for reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA. Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244
F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001); Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 220 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2000); Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F:3d 282 (11th Cir. 1997); Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99
F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 1996); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995); Barth
v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
195. "[Tjhe entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the
fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by." Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
197. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
198. The McDonnell Douglas decision is well known for devising a proof structure in which
the burden of production shifts between the parties in cases where the plaintiff has only
circumstantial evidence of discrimination. 411 U.S. 792. The goal behind this burden-shifting model
which creates a presumption of discrimination via the plaintiff's prima facie case is to "sharpen the
inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 8 (1981). On the other hand, the Price Waterhouse decision is
significant for its proof structure in cases where the plaintiff has what may be deemed "direct"

evidence of discrimination. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). For further discussion of these cases and the
development of employment law in the Title VII context, see Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in
Employment DiscriminationLaw Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L.
REV.

651 (2000).

199. Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
The 1991 Act was largely enacted to either overturn or modify a series of the Supreme Court's
employment law decisions, including Price Waterhouse. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., Inc., 511
U.S. 244, 250-51 (1994) (illustrating the 1991 Act's effects upon several of the Court's then-recent
decisions).
200. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m) (2000).
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changed the ultimate holding in that it was no longer required that the
immutable characteristic be a substantialmotivating factor.
Second, section 706(g)(2)(B) of the 1991 Act clearly specified the
available remedies when a claimant proves a violation of section 703(m)
and the defendant demonstrates that it "would have taken the same
factor." 20 2
action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
With this language, Congress illustrated the correct framework in direct
evidence cases.
Finally, section 701(m) of the 1991 Act specifically defined the
word demonstrate to mean "meets the burdens of production and
persuasion., 20 3 The purpose of this addition to Title VII was clearly to
dispel any confusion regarding the weight of the parties' respective
burdens of proof. Read together with the foregoing two provisions, it is
evident that the proof structure Congress sought to promulgate for direct
204
evidence cases involves a shifting burden of persuasion.
Congress implemented these provisions to clarify an ambiguity in Title
VII that the Supreme Court misinterpretedY.
The current predicament involving the proof structure in reasonable
accommodation cases under the ADA is similar to that which Title VII
endured. Like it did with Title VII, Congress should intervene and

201. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). If both parties meet their burden, relief is limited to
declaratory judgment, injunction and attorney's fees and costs "demonstrated to be directly
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m)." Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
The statute goes on to expressly prohibit courts from awarding damages or from ordering any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion or otherwise ordering that any payment be made. Id. §
2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
203. Id. § 2000e(m) (emphasis added).
204. The employee bears the burdens of production and persuasion in demonstrating that that
the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employment practice. Then the employer
bears the burdens of production and persuasion in demonstrating that it would have taken the same
action absent the impermissible motivating factor.
205. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(m), 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) with Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. 228. See also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., Inc., 511 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1994) (noting the
1991 Act's modifications of several Supreme Court employment law decisions); Belton, supra note
202 at 651-63 (discussing the effects on Title VII jurisprudence in light of the Supreme Court's
decisions in McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse, and the legislative response to the
confusing proof standards they created). That Congress took such swift action to alter the face of
employment law indicates it plainly disagreed with the way the Court was interpreting
antidiscrimination statutes. Note the significance of Justice O'Connor's opinions in the Price
Waterhouse and Barnett decisions. Justice O'Connor concurred in the plurality opinion in Price
Waterhouse, and was the only one to address the significance of direct evidence. Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 261-79. Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority opinion to arrive at a compromise
between the various opinions of the Court "despite her concerns" in another extremely close
decision. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1526-28.
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amend the ADA to specify precisely what proof structure should govern
disability discrimination, and expressly define the weight of the parties'
respective burdens. Several factors support such action.
First, the very purposes of the ADA are:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive nationalmandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards

addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in

enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of
individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce,

in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day
by people with disabilities.
Naturally, a court-made rule that fills a gap in an ambiguous statute
should be afforded deference if it is consistent with the statute's plain
meaning and legislative intent. Yet courts have done little to clarify the
ambiguity even though 'the ADA specifically calls for clear,
comprehensive, strong, consistent, enforceable standards encompassing
the sweep of congressional authority. Therefore, Congress should clarify
the ADA.
Second, Congress expressly delegated authority to regulate Title I
of the ADA to the EEOC. This grant of power should enable the EEOC
to interpret ambiguous terminology in Title I as it applies to Title 1.207
Furthermore, even if the agency does not have this power, the Supreme
20
Court should expressly analyze the agency's authority to wield it. 1
Third, the Supreme Court's opinion in Barnett did not clarify the
ADA's ambiguous proof structure in reasonable accommodation cases;
rather, it perpetuated the uncertainty. The various approaches to burden
allocation taken by the circuit courts pre-Barnett• were
not as
209
"functionally similar" as the Supreme Court may think. A shifting
206. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
207. Justice Stevens advocated this position in his dissent in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471,495-515 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting), which was joined by Justice Breyer.
208. Compare Bamett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (discarding the EEOC's interpretations of reasonable
accommodations and undue hardship without analyzing their validity where the agency's
interpretations favor employees) with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002)
(conducting a thorough analysis of the validity of the EEOC's interpretation of the direct threat
defense where the agency's interpretation favors employers).
209. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1523.
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210
burden of production
clearly is not the same as a shifting burden of
211'1
persuasion, and neither are the same as traditional burdens of proof.2 2
Additionally, requiring employees to merely prove that an
accommodation is possible 213 is not the same as requiring employees to
show that a proposed accommodation would enable them to perform the
essential functions of the job and that the proposed accommodation is at
least facially feasible for the employer.1 4 If the circuit court
interpretations of the ADA were this varied before the Supreme Court
decided Barnett, the Barnett holding itself will probably be subjected to
as diverse an array of interpretations unless the Court
shortly
gives
7,
211
substance to the "ordinarily or in the run of the cases" language.
Finally, a congressional resolution of this issue resembling that of
the 1991 Act would facilitate the pursuit and defense of disability
discrimination claims from the perspective of all parties involved:
(1) practitioners, who will be better positioned to advance their clients'
interests when dealing with a straightforward proof structure; (2) judges,
who will be able to rely upon clear, authoritative precedent in deciding
disputes; (3) federal agencies delegated authority to administer the
statute, which will be able to expend their resources on enforcement
instead of explaining statutory ambiguities; and (4) employers and
disabled employees who will realize enhanced representation, and whose
rights will thus be better protected.2 6 Accordingly, Congress should

210. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 950-51 (8th Cir. 1999).
211. Jackan v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000).
212. Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 284 (1 lthCir. 1997).
213. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995).
214. Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001).
215. Barnett, 122 S.Ct. at 1523. For example, the majority in Barnett only expressly cites to
the First, Second and District of Columbia Circuits' approaches as proper interpretations of the
ADA's vague proof structure. Id. Thus, it is unclear whether'the Court has effectively limited lower
courts to relying upon these approaches. See, e.g., Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City
of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 783-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Barnett, but continuing to rely upon
pre-Barnett decisions); Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 963-64 (10th Cir. 2002) (relying
upon pre-Barnett precedent for the reasonable accommodation proof structure); EEOC v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2270, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16826, at *58-60 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4,
2002) (failing to cite Barnett in its analysis of the appropriate allocation of burdens of proof while
relying on the pre-Barnett precedent).
216. Note that this section does not advance the view that the ADA should employ the same
proof structure as Title VII, as the two statutes' protections may not be analogous. Knych, supra
note 63 (arguing that courts should not rely upon the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting proof
structure in Title VII claims for guidance under the ADA because the statutes involve distinct types
of discrimination). For example, the ADA offers employers a cost justification defense, whereas
Title VII does not. Undue hardship to the operation of the employer's business is the very factor that
excuses discrimination against the disabled, but costs will not excuse discrimination against
individuals upon the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. City of L.A. Dep't of
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modify the ADA to specify a clear proof structure for reasonable
accommodation cases and indicate the weight of the respective burdens
of proof just as it did to Title VII via the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite being touted at its passage as the most significant civil
rights legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2"' the ADA has
since been criticized for its ambiguous standards. Regrettably, the
criticism is not unfounded. The ADA's lack of a clear proof structure
has resulted in a significant reduction in its ability to provide adequate
remedies for employees bringing reasonable accommodation claims.
The fact that the circuit courts have implemented different proof
structures alone shows the ADA is not being properly applied.
The Supreme Court's decision in Barnett, although fair to the parties,
did little to clarify the statute's vague standards. As a result, disabled
employees bringing discrimination claims have not enjoyed the ADA's
promise of accommodation, and all parties involved are left without the
clear, strong, consistent standards the ADA sought to achieve.
Although the EEOC was given a broad grant of power to regulate
and fill any gaps in Title I of the ADA, its interpretations of reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship generally have not been afforded
deference. Yet the agency's interpretation of the ADA's proof structure
is logical and consistent with congressional intent. The two-pronged
reasonable accommodation definition gathered from reading the EEOC's
regulations and Interpretive Guidance together is a permissible
construction of the ADA. Therefore, it should be accorded the force of
law or should at least merit some deference. At the very least, the
Supreme Court should determine the extent of the agency's authority as
well as the validity of its regulations and Interpretative Guidance in
relation to the ADA's vague reasonable accommodation standard.
Furthermore, the circuit split, the lack of deference to the EEOC
and the development of disparate treatment law under Title VII reveal
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (refusing to permit the heightened cost of
insurance premiums for male employees as opposed to female employees due to longevity
calculations to justify a 14.84% disparity in pension fund contributions based solely upon sex); Int'l
Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991) ("The extra cost of employing members of
one sex, however, does not provide an affirmative Title VII defense for a discriminatory refusal to
hire members of that gender.") (citation omitted). Rather, this section merely considers the history
and development of employment law under'Title VII as a respected predecessor of the ADA, and
proposes that Congress resolve a similar issue of statutory interpretation in like manner.
217. Locke, supra note 5, at 108.
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that the ADA's vague standards are ripe for legislative clarification.
Congress should modify the ADA just as the Civil Rights Act of 1991
modified Title VII's proof structure so that judges, practitioners, parties,
and administrative agencies alike will better comprehend the extent of
the statute's reach and the exact process for litigating reasonable
accommodation claims. Doing so would create the clear, comprehensive,
strong, consistent, enforceable standard originally sought by Congress.
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